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China and the International Legal Order:
An Historical Introduction
by Daniel J. Hoffheimer*
INTRODUCTION

ESPITE THE CONTRACTION of the world through technology,
education and social and cultural interchange, the People's
Republic of China remains in many respects an isolated and enigmatic
society, remarkably closed and separate from an increasingly interdependent international legal order. The purpose of this paper is to
explore some of the reasons for China's isolation and to speculate upon
the manner in which China is becoming a participant in an international legal order and the likelihood that its participation will conform
with that of other nation-states. Moreover, this paper will suggest that
the historical endurance and momentum of Chinese society will require
that the international legal order must accept some Chinese ideas and
incorporate some of the practices and demands of China.
China's introspection and isolation since the establishment of the
People's Republic in 1949, and its distinctive international political
behavior has been attributable primarily to China's international
politics. Since the death of Mao Tse-tung, however, China has begun
to expand its consciousness and direct its perspective outward.
Although it may be a remarkable happenstance that a nation as huge
and culturally sophisticated as China has been so introspective and exclusive, it should not be surprising to see China assume an increasingly
influential role in the international legal order. In so doing, it is inconceivable that China will not make her own contributions to the
evolving style and content of international law. Although it is too early
to predict the specific contributions and influences which China may
offer, it is appropriate to explore certain attitudes and experiences
which reflect China's, present relationship with the international legal
order. At the very least, such an evaluation may highlight the social,
political and legal determinants which have shaped and will continue
to shape Chinese attitudes toward international law.
* Member of the Ohio Bar; A.B. (1973),
University of Virginia.

Harvard University; J.D. (1976),
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THE TRADITIONAL CHINESE WORLD ORDER

An understanding of modern China's view of the international
legal order must commence with an analysis of traditional China's
political ideology. Such an understanding cannot be derived from a
cursory review of Chinese history, and contemporary sinology is continuously challenging and refining stereotypical notions of "traditional"
thought. Nevertheless, certain themes have pervaded Chinese conceptions about world order and China's place in it.'
The traditional Chinese image of world order conceived of China
as a catholic culture which the Chinese termed T'ien Hsia-"all under
heaven." The universal Chinese emperor was the "Son of Heaven," and
he held on earth a cosmic status reflective of the order of the celestial
universe.' The Chinese characters for "China" today remain ChungKuo-"the Middle Kingdom." Thus, China has seen itself not as a nation among many but as world order in itself. This world view was
reinforced and refined through centuries of Confucian philosophy, as
it became the official ideology of the Chinese Empire. Because of
China's ingenius capacity over the centuries to withstand ideological
challenges from neighboring peoples and, in most instances, to absorb
them, to varying degrees, into the Chinese cultural world, China retained its vision of world order intact until the nineteenth century
when the encroachment of the West forced a fundamental readjustment.
Distilled to simplistic terms, traditional China viewed itself as a
macrocosmic Confucian family, ruled by the Emperor, with all of the
ideological conceptions which comprised Confucian philosophy and
political theory in its ever-evolving transformations. Of paramount importance was the fact that China never conceived of itself as a-nationstate or political or sovereign subdivision of a larger international legal
system. China's view of the international legal order was simply China.
All other lands and peoples were barbarians peripheral to the "Middle
Kingdom," to which all others paid homage as the cultural and
' For good discussions of traditional Chinese ideology relating to world order,
see Yang, Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order, in THE CHINESE WORLD
ORDER 20 (J. Fairbank ed. 1968); Schwartz, The Chinese Perception of World Order,

Past and Present, in id. at 276; Schwartz, The Maoist Image of World Order, 21 J.
INT'L AFF. 1 (1967), reprinted in B. SCHWARTZ, COMMUNISM AND CHINA: IDEOLOGY IN
FLUX 228, 230-32 (1968); I. OJHA, CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN AN AGE OF TRANSITION 125 (1970).
2

For a discussion of the parallelism between traditional Chinese perceptions of

world order and cosmic order, see Hoffheimer, Science and Symbolism in Chiiiese
Astronomy, SYNTHESIS, Jan. 1974, at 24, 27-28.
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ideological ruler of the universe of men. Traditional China's conception of legal order, therefore, generally excluded notions of public law
assumed in the West. For example, China recognized no legal rules
which restrained or regulated political activity between nations or
granted rights and obligations to foreign peoples or their governments.
It is not surprising, therefore, that traditional Chinese
jurisprudence is virtually devoid of any systematic treatises on comparative and international law. Law was simply another aspect of the
Chinese morality which governed all human activity. Nothing similar
to Roman law concepts governing international relations, such as ius
gentium or sovereignty, are to be found. There was no system of
sovereign states, but only one China. China's relations with her
tributary states and surrounding peoples reflected the familial qualities
of Confucianism: China acted like a parent and expected alien peoples
to act like her children. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest
that traditional China never accepted any notion of an international
legal system comprised of different participants, but saw world order
as an extension of the Chinese Empire and a reflection of the cosmos.
The foregoing characterizations of traditional Chinese perspectives
on world order is painfully inadequate. It ignores both the
kaleidoscopic diversity and the contortions of Chinese history, as well
as the many divergences between theory and practice. It serves, nevertheless, to emphasize the unique direction from which China entered
the modern, interdependent world.
II.

CHINA'S WORLD ORDER IN REVOLUTION

The Confucian ethos which had provided the Chinese polity with
its legitimacy and self-image for millenia was destroyed by the Chinese
Revolution. The central problem of Chinese political life and the fundamental concern of Chinese thought for the past century, and
especially since the revolution, has been the creation of a new ideology
to replace Confucianism. The intellectual life of modern China has
been a prism of theories and exploration and, in the face of external
imperialism and internal revolution, it is not surprising that the
dynamic model of the Russian Revolution has, since 1917, been of
paramount importance. The Russian Revolution, after all, was quickly
able to displace the inefficient and inequitable Czarist autocracy. It
was further able, after several years of civil war, to establish at least
the shell of a modern nation-state capable of withstanding the threats
of modern warfare and technology in a hostile international legal
system.
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It was this system, created and imposed by the West, with which
China was finally forced to deal at the end of the nineteenth century.
Compared with Russia's revolution, however, the Chinese Revolution
was a far more complicated process of salvaging an entire civilization
in danger of extinction from external encroachment by powerful
nation-states and from internal political and social decay.
The Chinese intellectuals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century, including the intellectual founders of the Chinese Communist
Party, sought to create a new foundation for Chinese civilization. The
entropy of China's traditional Weltanschauung, or world view, forced
China to search out its place in the multi-state international system
which had spread out from Europe since the Roman Empire and had
solidified following the fragmentation of Christiandom after the
Renaissance. 3 Regardless of the alternatives available at certain points
in China's modern history, it is now clear that Chinese Communism
was the most attractive and successful ideology. Communism offered
China a new political culture with integral ideological, sociological and
institutional constituents needed to give China a desirable role in the
modern international order. Marxism-Leninism-Maoism meshed well
with the Chinese Revolution because it offered a modern, absolute and
totalistic doctrine which was largely founded on a scientific critique of
Western imperialism, China's primary enemy. 4 In this, Mao Tse-tung,
Sun Yat-sen and Chiang K'ai-shek were agreed: The establishment of
national identity and unity through resistance to imperialism, which
included eradicating internal weaknesses such as warlordism and
political underdevelopment, was the indispensible prerequisite to the
continuation of China as a separate cultural entity in the international
order.
III.

IDEOLOGICAL AND HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN
CHINA'S SELF-IMAGE IN WORLD ORDER

A.

The Impact of Imperialism

Chinese revolutionaries did not seize upon Marxism-Leninism simply as a rationalization for political power and national development.
Above all, they seized upon it because Lenin's theory of imperialism

'

See Schwartz, The Chinese Perception of World Order, Past and Present,
supra note 1, at 284.
4 See Hoffheimer, Law and Modernization in China: The Juridical Behatior of
the Chinese Communists, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 515, 522 (1977).
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served as an ingenious explanation for the failure of the colonial,
backward areas of the world to throw the spark into the over-loaded
mine of world capitalism as Marx had predicted. 5 Lenin's remarkable
little book, Imperialism, seemed to explain China's unfortunate
predicament of subjugation by Western nation-states. Chinese Marxists, like Lenin, emphasized the voluntarist strain in Marxian theory to
seize control over the forces of history, which hitherto had brought
China to its knees. Of course, the elevation of political ideology over
economic determinism also implied the primacy of party organization
over the class base, which was well-suited to a country such as China
which had virtually no urban proletariat. In this way, MarxismLeninism began its transmogrification and sinification to Chinese reality. The Chinese Communist Party, therefore, became a conscious
agent of historical and social change, including the agent of
strengthening China's self-defense against a hostile international legal
system.
Despite its symbolic importance to the development of Chinese
Communism, Bolshevism, including its Stalinist contortions, did not
provide a realistic model for the creation of a Chinese nation-state or
even for the seizure of power by the Chinese Nationalists or the
Chinese Communists. Sun Yat-sen's Bolshevik-style putsches had failed
in dozens of uprisings; the seizure of Canton in 1911 did not go nearly
so far toward winning the revolution in China as Lenin's seizure of
Moscow and St. Petersburg had done in Russia. The Bolshevik-type
party organization, as adopted by Sun's Chinese Nationalist Party
(Kuomintang) after 1924, did not offer the needed solutions to the
problems of the Chinese Revolution because the imperialistic threat to
China was far greater than it was in Russia.
While the yellow peril was an unfounded myth, the white peril in
China was a painful and obvious fact of history. Lenin's theory of imperialism provided not only a simple explanation with which Chinese
Communists could manipulate symbols of anti-imperialism and nationalism," but it articulated China's predicament in a comprehensive
world view. Fifteen years before Lenin's Imperialism appeared in 1917,
Marx, Revolution in China and in Europe, New York Daily Tribune, June 14,
1853, reprinted in KARL MARX ON COLONIALISM AND MODERNIZATION 73 (S. Avineri
ed. 1968).
6 Wilbur, The Influence of the Past: How the Early Years Helped to Shape the
Future of the Chinese Communist Party, in PARTY LEADERSHIP AND REVOLUTIONARY
POWER IN CHINA 43 (J. Lewis ed. 1970).
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in fact, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, the greatest Chinese thinker of the late nineteenth century, had carefully defined imperialism as "the industrial
power of the citizens of a nation [which] has been fully developed
domestically and must flow to the outside.... ." Both Liang and Li
Ta-chao, the leading founder of Chinese Communism, expressed imperialism in terms of international racial conflict and were able, in
dialectical fashion, to focus on China as a distinct nation rather than
as a universal culture. Li went so far as to articulate imperialistic exploitation of the Oriental peoples as a class struggle on the international level. 8 This early emphasis on imperialism, long before 1917,
turned the attention of Chinese revolutionaries to the problem of
building up the nation. Chinese nationalism thus became indistinguishable from anti-imperialism.
B.

The Impact of Popular Mobilization and Communism

Nationalism was not just a problem of anti-imperialism, however,
but one of anti-localism as well. The revolution was as much a process
of reintegrating the fragmented provinces and elevating the loyalties of
the people from the family to the national level as it was a defense
against imperialism. Long before Stalin gave Chiang K'ai-shek's
Northern Expedition against the warlords the stamp of orthodoxy,
Mao and other radicals had given it enthusiastic support as a first step
toward national unity. For the same reason, Mao in 1926 supported
Chiang unequivocally as the "leader" of the nationalist revolution,
revealing his belief in the priority of national over social goals. 9 The
Chinese problem of arousing a patriotic citizenry in order to create a
nation-state was similar to the problem Lenin encountered in Russia
with a slumbering proletariat, but in China the task demanded a far
greater leap in the consciousness of all classes.
Both Lenin and Trotsky believed that, with the help of communist
parties, the proletariat in colonial countries, miniscule as it was, would
develop not nationalism, but greater feelings of class solidarity. Imperialism, they believed, actually intensified class struggle within exLiang Ch'i-ch'ao, The Renovation of the People (1902), in CHINA'S RESPONSE
TO THE WEST 221 (S. Teng & J. Fairbank eds. 1954).
' See generally J. LEVENSON, LIANG CH'I-CH'AO AND THE MIND OF MODERN
CHINA 101-03 (1953); MARXISM AND ASIA 206, 220 (H. d'Encausse & S. Schram eds.

1969).
,

See generally S. SCHRAM,

MAO TSE-TUNG

OF MAO TSE-TUNG (S. Schram ed. 1969).

81 (1966);

THE POLITICAL THOUGHT
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ploited countries.' 0 The urban areas of China had received the greatest
imperialist impact in the 1920's, the time'of closest Party contact with
the proletariat. The difficulty which the Chinese Communists encountered in urban mass organization at that time clearly qualifies the
Leninist thesis; in fact, the Chinese Communists had far greater success in mobilizing the rural villages, which had experienced less
Western impact." In the countryside, after all, it took little effort for
peasants to recognize as "unequal treaties" the tenancy and landholding arrangements which often claimed seventy percent of their
crops.' 2 The Chinese efforts against "feudal" landlords were hardly
akin to Leninist anti-imperialism, yet the liberation of the peasants was
certainly crucial to arousing a patriotic citizenry which would value a
stake in the political system. Micro-societal reorganization, therefore,
was as much a prerequisite to nationalism and a modern nation-state
as to liberation from imperialism.' 3
C.

The Role of Leadership in Developing National Identity

The Leninist conspiratorial party organization provided Chinese
Marxists with an instrument for putting their nationalist and socialist
aspirations into practice. Chinese rebellions in the past, they realized,
had failed because of insufficient organization. Even the largest
rebellion in world history, that of the T'ai-p'ings in the mid-nineteenth
century, 4 had been crushed by the decrepit Ch'ing regional armies
because of their failure to institute effective organization. The Leninist
party, therefore, provided both the organizational power for the
politically conscious leadership and the rudiments of legitimation for
revolutionary authority.
10 L. TROTSKY, PROBLEMS OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION 27-28 (1932).
" Hofheinz, The Ecology of Chinese Communist Success: Rural Influence Patterns 1923-1945, in CHINESE COMMUNIST POLITICS IN ACTION 68-69 (A. Barnett ed.
1969).
12 H. ISAACS, THE TRAGEDY OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION 221 (1951).
is One scholar has argued that provincialism contributed strongly to the rise of
nationalism by fostering political loyalties within provinces and small regions. See Fincher, PoliticalProvincialism and the National Revolution, in CHINA IN REVOLUTION:
THE FIRST PHASE, 1900-1913 (M. Wright ed. 1969). Communist village organization
later had the same effect. See Hoffheimer, supra note 4, at 527-29.
14 The T'ai-p'ing Rebellion, 1850-1864, was a massive but unsuccessful attempt
led by Hung Hsiu-ch'iian to overthrow the Manchu dynasty. The Manchus had in the
seventeenth century conquered China and managed to maintain a brilliant and powerful
government until about 1800, after which they rapidly decayed in energy and ability.
It was not, however, until 1912 that the Manchu, or Ching, dynasty was overthrown.
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Lenin's theory of imperialism had demanded national liberation as
a prerequisite to socialist revolution. The revolutionary, guerrilla struggle against the Chinese Nationalist Party was one step in this fight for
national liberation. Stalin, in one of his more accurate and even
Leninist characterizations, described the nature that a revolutionary
government would assume in China as being generally similar to the
government "that was being talked about" in Russia in 1905, that is, a
"democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry-but with
the difference that in China it would have to be first and foremost an
anti-imperialist government."'" The Party's de-emphasis on class struggle by the urban proletariat and its willingness to enter into political
alliances with the bourgeoisie were quite easily legitimized by Lenin's
theory of imperialism.
The excruciating dilemma of the Comintern in the 1930's, whether
to emphasize class struggle or unified national resistance to imperialism, was not really relevant to China. From Stalin's policy of the
"four class bloc" only a subtle and relatively natural shift was needed
to reach Mao's 1935 speech "On New Democracy," which candidly
summarized the realities of class relations in China. This speech
legitimized for China what Lenin had called the "joint dictatorship of
all revolutionary classes." The Chinese Communists were thus able to
ally with the "big" and even the "comprador" bourgeoisie, as well as
with the "national" bourgeoisie-so long as they were patriotic. 16 Anticipating the Japanese invasion, the New Democracy created a multiclass alliance for a united front against Japan and astutely provided
the theoretical foundation for Communist leadership in any alliance
with the Nationalists. No longer would the national bourgeoisie be
allowed "leadership" in the revolution as it had been before 1926; too
large a section of it had proved itself counter-revolutionary. The
divorce of the Communist Party from its theoretical class base, the
urban proletariat, actually elevated the symbolic pre-eminence of the
proletariat in the alliance of all revolutionary classes.
In articulating the class relations among the Chinese people, Mao
was above all, being a nationalist. A major distinction of the Chinese
from the Soviet experience was the ability of the former to rely on the
example of another socialist state, the Soviet Union, in their own
attempts to create one in China. The October Revolution, Mao said,
had made the Chinese bourgeois-democratic front, . .. a part of the
Quoted in
16 Id.

at 251.

MARXISM AND ASIA, supra note

8, at 227.
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proletarian socialist revolution.' 7 Because this Chinese version of the
European Popular Front was a rural struggle against Japanese imperialism, the peasantry itself became a nationalist, as well as revolutionary, class. The revolutionary civil war was more than a struggle for
political power on behalf of the proletariat; the nationalist phase of
the revolution, though merged with the socialistic revolution, constituted a united front against domestic "feudalism" and the backwardness of the peasantry.'"
The united front, therefore, was not merely a struggle against an
external foe, but the integration of all classes into the nation. With the
national revolution considered a part of the proletarian revolution, the
peasants were able, in theory, to make the qualitative change into
nationalists, and even into socialists. The Party was thereby able to
fuse the process of nation-building with its socialist objectives.
"Revolution is impossible," said Lenin, "without a national crisis
affecting both the exploited and the exploiters."' 9 The Japanese invasion, by threatening all of Chinese society, provided the impetus for
unified national resistance. Chiang K'ai-shek believed that the Chinese
"state" would be formed as a result of resistance to imperialism.20
Although his concept of the "state" was quite different, Mao also
believed that through the dialectic transformation of imperialism
from a threat into a force for change, the people could use the war as
a means for creating national identity and power.
By the 1930's formalistic and dogmatic subservience to Soviet
models had proven irrelevant to China and had to be rejected.
"Chinese Communists are Marxian internationalists," Mao said, "but
Marxism must be expressed in national form for practical realization."
As an historical materialist, he knew that "there is no such thing as
abstract Marxism, only concrete Marxism." By 1945, Liu Shao-chi had
considered Mao's insights to be "an admirable model for the nationalization of Marxism" in other colonial countries. 2'
At the micro-societal level, the Communists revolutionized north
Chinese society by breaking down its "feudal" statis through conflict

"

Mao Tse-tung, On New Democracy, in 2 SELECTED WORKS 344 (1967).

'8

Id. at 341.

9 V.I.

LENIN, LEFT-WING COMMUNISM: AN INFANTILE DISORDER
" CHIANG K'AI-SHEK, CHINA'S DESTINY 29 (1937).

65 (1940).

"1 Mao Tse-tung, Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee on the Popularization
of Propaganda, in MAO'S CHINA: PARTY REFORM DOCUMENTS 1942-1944, at 253-54

(B. Compton ed. 1952).
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and struggle in the villages, and by reintegrating the people in a new
political system-a nation-state. Two fundamental stages were utilized
for social mobilization and political development. First, there was the
destruction of old habits and political alignments, and, second, there
was the induction of the politically conscious masses into stable, new
patterns of community and organizational commitment. 22 Both stages
were institutionalized in China by 1942.
Mao's theory and practice of the New Democracy succeeded in
realizing the manifesto expounded by its semantic forebear, Liang
Ch'i-ch'ao's New People of 1902. "A state," he had said, must be
formed "by the assembly of its people."2 For the first time in Chinese
history, a large number of the Chinese people has assumed a genuine
role in their own government and would be able to provide much of
the initiative for political and economic development.
The communists' breakthrough during the 1930's and 1940's in
successful nation-building was, above all, the result of the leadership's
own behavior. It was the manner in which the Party responded to the.
crisis of Japanese imperialism and to their own divorce from the proletariat which perpetuated and strengthened the Party's authority.
Neither the national crisis nor the social reforms alone gave the Party
its mandate. The emphasis of the New Democracy on political
alignments over class origins was primarily responsible for the
reintegration of the people into the nation. But this process of nationbuilding, which most Western political scientists see as the ultimate
socio-political trend of underdeveloped countries, was to the Chinese
Communists only one step toward a much larger vision of socialism
and communism. The party's Marxist-Leninist ideology was not, as
some have argued, merely an "adjunct" to nationalism useful in
mobilizing the people for political and economic goals. 2 4 Even Mao's
New Democracy, by stressing political alignments in the process of
reintegration, helped to preserve the ultimate class origins in the
Party's consciousness. With the Soviet Union as a revolutionary
bulwark and with peasants able to make "qualitative leaps," the
development of post-colonial China was intended to go beyond nation22 Deutsch, Social Mobilization and Political Development, in 55 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 493 (1961).
28 Quoted in CHINA'S RESPONSE TO THE WEST, supra note 7, at 220.
24 See generally C. JOHNSON, PEASANT NATIONALISM AND COMMUNIST POWER:
THE EMERGENCE OF REVOLUTIONARY CHINA ix, 30 (1962); F. SCHURMANN, IDEOLOGY
AND ORGANIZATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA

107 (1966).
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building to merge the bourgeois-democratic with the proletariansocialist revolution. Nevertheless, China's new nationalism and
widespread political consciousness was a continuing process which placed China squarely, for the first time, in an international legal order on
terms commensurate with the West.
IV.

CHINA AS A NATION-STATE IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER

In evaluating the long process of China's emergence as a modern
nation-state, several overriding generalizations can fairly accurately be
made. Regardless of the traditional and even Confucian language
employed by Chiang, Sun and the young Mao, all of the leaders of
China since the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty in 1911 have been ardent
nationalists. Although Chinese concepts such as "sovereignty," "nation"
and "international" are colored by China's past, a fundamental component of Chinese Communism is Chinese nationalism. In their evolving conceptions of China as a sovereign and independent nation, both
Chiang and Mao and their successors reflect Grotius and Bodin 25 more
than Confucius.
Chinese Communist doctrine and practice, particularly since the
death of Stalin and the advent of the Sino-Soviet rift in the mid-1950's,
illustrate that the tensions between foreign-derived aspects of Chinese
ideology and uniquely Chinese aspects have almost always been resolved in favor of the latter. Thus, the Chinese have consistently espoused
and supported movements of national liberation, both communist and
noncommunist, even when opposed by Moscow. 26 At the same time,
China's rejection of Soviet ideological hegemony implies an assertion of
Chinese orthodoxy-the thought of Chairman Mao-and seems to indicate the reappearance, in a new guise, of the traditional Chinese
pattern of emphasizing China's unique role in the world. The new
rhetoric and style of Chinese foreign relations, however, has an entirely
different content than could be expected from the traditional ap" Hugo Grotius, 1583-1645. To a great extent, twentieth century international
law has followed the precepts which the Dutchman Grotius developed in De Juri
Belliac Pacis, and in several other works on jurisprudence. Jean Bodin, 1529 or

1530-1596, was a French political philosopher whose exposition of the principles of
government was influential in Western Europe when feudal systems were being replaced
by centralized nation-states.
26

The Chinese postion on the Pakistan/Bangladesh problem, although apparent-

ly inconsistent with this generalization, should be viewed in light of China's national
interests in Tibet and the Sino-Indian border areas.
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proach. In post-Mao China, one witnesses the further evolution in
Chinese foreign policy of China's participation in the international
legal order, but an evolution within the context of China's nationalism
and sovereignty.
V.

THE BASIC ASSUMPTIONS OF CHINESE PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW

Once one understands the direction from which China has become
an actor on the modern international stage, China's style of participation in international affairs becomes far more comprehensible. In view
of the total annihiliation of the traditional Chinese idea of world order
by the beginning of the twentieth century, China has had to establish
a new place for itself in the world and to justify new goals for its international affairs. Several themes can be seen in China's practice of international law since 1949.
The first and most obvious theme is Chinese nationalism. Because
of imperialism and internal decay-and because of China's unique
response to these threats-it is not surprising to see nationalism as a
fundamental assumption of China's foreign relations and attitudes
toward international legal order. China's insistence that Peking alone,
and not Taipei, is the seat of Chinese sovereignty, coupled with
China's relentless pursuit of free negotiation of treaties on an equal
basis and its insistence on equality in all international organizations,
are simply reflections of China's demand that it be treated by all
nations as a sovereign equal.
Related to the assumption of nationalism is China's implicit faith
in and respect for power politics. When Mao said that "power grows
out of the barrel of a gun," he meant, among other things, that China
had to face the reality that political and legal authority presupposes
international physical power. In holding this view, the Chinese have
resembled legal positivists. Power politics and Realpolitik are, in
China's view, the salient characteristics of Western international law.
The territorial battles of European nations and their outward
expansion in imperialist politics epitomize for China the West's practice of international law. Traditionally, this system did not work for
China because China was not an equal participant. For example,
Woodrow Wilson's "magnanimous" Fourteen Points" did not attack
" In President Wilson's wartime declaration of January 8, 1918, he proposed for
the postwar world a new, open diplomacy to replace the alliance system which had led!
to the First World War.
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the unequal treaties which had brought China to its knees. Despite
the report of the Lytton Commission2 8 condemning Japanese imperialism in China, China remained subject to unequal treaties until
the mid-1940's. In its weakness, China could only interpret America's
flip-flop on China's sovereignty over Taiwan from the Cairo Declaration in 1943 to the official position taken in 1950,29 as one more indication of Western imperialism. The Chinese have gained respect for
physical power from these bitter past experiences.
A third theme of China's participation in the evolving international
legal order is its moralistic attitude. Perhaps to some degree, China's
emphasis on moral principles, such as equality, as fundamental prerequisites for participation in international affairs reflects traditional
consciousness, borne into the present by symbolic language and by a
predisposition to ideological orthodoxy. It is not surprising, therefore,
to see China repeatedly condemn other nations' actions in vehement,
absolutist rhetoric. The language of China's attitudes toward international legal order consistently appears as moralistic overstatement.
Thus, it is not surprising that the failure until December 15, 1978, of
the United States to recognize the People's Republic as the legitimate
government of China was met with moral, as well as political, condemnation in Chinese pronouncements.
A fourth, and probably the most important theme that permeates
China's ever-changing practice of international law is its pragmatism,
its dialectical capacity to turn adversity to advantage and weakness to
strength. Despite the continuities of the past and China's bitter distrust
of Western international legal rules and ideals, China has, in some important ways, become a zealous believer in some of the basic assumptions of the Western international legal order. No nation more
28 The Lytton Inquiry Commission was organized by the League of Nations in

response to Chinese demands for enforcement of the League's sanctions against Japan
following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. After investigating the situation, the Commission report recommended that sanctions should be employed to force
Japan to withdraw. Although the assembly unanimously adopted this report in
February 1933, Japan withdrew from the League a month later and no sanctions were
ever actually imposed.
29 At the Cairo Conference in 1943, President Roosevelt agreed that Taiwan
should be returned to China after the defeat of Japan. Following the outbreak of the
Korean War in June 1950, President Truman declared that the future status of
Taiwan had not yet been determined, and suggested that there was a possibility that
the island might be returned to Japan, which had held it from 1895-1945. Clough,
The Taiwan Issue in Sino-American Relations, in CHINA AND AMERICA 151-53 (W.

Barnds ed. 1977).
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vociferously defends its national self-interest and sovereignty than
China. Logically, therefore, China has exercised admirable skill in treaty
negotiation and international diplomacy whenever such activity augments
China's standing in world politics and helps it assume equality
with other nations. China's attitudes are reactionary, rather than inherently creative. They are reactionary both to China's imperialist past
and to the historic hostility of the Western international system. Instead of withdrawal into isolation, however, China has mastered
Western techniques and has employed them to pursue its own goals. In
this sense, China has embraced the West's own style of power politics.
The dramatic achievements of the Chinese Communists in treaty
negotiation are perhaps most symbolic of this achievement. Although
the Chinese have accepted negotiation, they have been adverse to international adjudication for the reason that commitment of issues to
the jurisdiction, for example, of the International Court of Justice,
would risk China's subjection to Western power.
VI.

CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE

From the basic themes that permeate China's view of international
legal order, a tentative assessment can be made regarding the future.
First, Chinese perspectives on international order will remain premised
upon the politics of self-protection and national defense. China
became a nation-state involuntarily as a reaction against Western imperialism and internal disintegration. Its participation in the international legal order will be premised upon China's security from a
hostile, predominantly Western world.
Second, because of the totalistic ideological framework of both
Confucianism and Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, one should not expect
to witness the development of a Chinese jurisprudence of international
law. The manifold refinements and legal rules which comprise Western
international legal theory are inconsistent with Chinese ideological flexibility. However, in practice the evolution of Chinese attitudes toward
the international legal order may become similar to ideas of world
public order and human dignity which have been espoused by a
leading school of Western international lawyers. 30 So long as human
rights and other issues are seen by the Chinese as political rhetoric
80 See, e.g., McDougal, Human Rights and World Public Order: Principles of
Content and Procedurefor Clarifying General Community Policies, 14 VA. J. INT'L L.
387 (1974); Note, The Lasswell-McDougal Enterprise: Toward a World Public Order
of Human Dignity, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 535 (1974).
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employed by the West to further its national interests, China will see
such concepts as threats to Chinese internal political flexibility and its
equality in international affairs.
Third, although China has in most respects become a modern
nation-state, as defined by most Western social scientists, one should
not expect China to discard its ancient cultural inheritance. China is
unlikely to develop a technical appreciation for Western legal institutions and legal rules, including those creating individual rights and
obligations. China's goal of international peace will be sought within
the confines of China's moralistic self-righteousness and national selfinterest which, of course, is no different from the motivation of
Western states. In short, China will not sacrifice its political and
ideological perspectives and blindly accept the Western international
nation-state system without substantial modification."1 Hence, China
will continue to be a hostile participant in the Western system and will
reject the myths and rhetoric of Western diplomacy unless China is
permitted to participate on equal terms. This is not to say that China
will oppose the basic assumptions of Western international law, including peaceful co-existence, human rights and economic well-being.
The distinction will be between the means used by the Chinese and the
West to further these goals, rather than in the ends themselves.
Because of these considerations, the international legal order will
continue to operate flexibly, fragilely and unpredictably-not as a
"system," but as a fluid and complex interdependence of values and
aspirations.3 2 One should not expect a stable and legitimate international legal order with widespread acceptance to evolve within the few
decades ahead. In order to accomplish the shared goals of mankind
through international legal order, the West will have to sacrifice some
of its traditional and cherished legal rhetoric and mythology.3 3 Such a
" See Cohen, Chinese Attitudes Toward International Law-and Our Own, in
(J. Cohen ed. 1970); see also Hoffheimer,
supra note 4, at 550.
32 My use of the concept of "international legal order" is considerably broader
than the idea of an "international legal system." See Berman, The Ori'ns of Western
Legal Science, 90 HARV. L. REV. 894 (1977). Above all, legal order includes contiguous aspects of the legal system including the political and sociological com
ponents.
33 For a recent and compelling argument forthe need for accommodation by the
West, and by the United States in particular, in international affairs, see S. HoFFCONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAw 282, 292-93
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concession by Western nations will be difficult and will not be possible
without a much deeper and more sophisticated understanding of and
respect for the strengths of Chinese values, as well as of the cultures of
other non-Western societies. Such understanding is indispensable to a
meaningful and legitimate international order in an increasingly complex and interdependent world.

